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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

THE IMPLICATIONS OF I.R.C. § 280E IN DENYING ORDINARY
AND NECESSARY BUSINESS EXPENSE DEDUCTIONS TO DRUG
TRAFFICKERS
. . . Bring A Ton of Keys From Puerto Rico
...
[T]hese Feds Want Me for Some Tax Evasion1

I. INTRODUCTION
Until quite recently, the tax code took a facially neutral view towards the
use of deductions and credits by illegal drug traffickers. However, the Tax
Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Tax Act of 19822 introduced section 280E to
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended (“the Code”). Section 280E
denies credits and deductions “for any amount paid or incurred during the
taxable year in carrying on any trade or business [that] . . . consists of
trafficking in controlled substances . . . .”3 The language of this provision is
applicable only to that portion of the population who choose to earn their
livelihood by dealing drugs.
Section 62(a) of the Code defines adjusted gross income as income less
certain deductions, including deductions attributable to a taxpayer’s trade or
business and those permitted under section 162.4 Section 162 allows
deductions for all “ordinary and necessary” expenses incurred in the operation
of a taxpayer’s business.5 However, the language of section 280E effectively
denies the availability of section 162 business deductions to illegal drug
traffickers. Generally, the income tax is not discriminatory as to the nature of
income, and the Code imposes a tax on all gross income “from whatever
source derived.”6 However, the ultimate effect of section 280E is to impose a

1. LL COOL J, I Shot Ya (Remix), on MR. SMITH (Universal/Def Jam 1995). Song on file
with author; lyrics available at http://www.azlyrics.com/lyrics/llcoolj/ishotyaremix.html (last
visited August 25, 2002).
2. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324
(1982) (codified in various sections of 26 U.S.C.).
3. I.R.C. § 280E (2000) (indicating that relevant definitions can be found in the Controlled
Substances Act or any other Federal or State law).
4. I.R.C. § 62 (2000).
5. I.R.C. § 162 (2000).
6. I.R.C. § 61 (2000).
157
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higher burden of taxation on a drug trafficker’s gross income by denying any
deductions the drug trafficking taxpayer would otherwise be allowed to take.7
Public policy justifications are the basis for the inclusion of section 280E
in the Code.8 However, the section does not conform to the general unbiased
functioning of the Code; drug dealers are singled out as a group and are denied
access to the normal system of deductions and credits available to “legitimate”
business operators. In addition, there is little contemporary evidence to
support the alleged public policy justification and the contention that section
280E is effectively deterring the drug problem.9 This lack of evidence
suggests that section 280E is an out-dated provision that should be omitted
from the Code.
This Comment will focus on section 280E and the consequences of
denying section 162 ordinary and necessary business deductions to illegal drug
traffickers. This Comment will begin by examining the historical treatment of
illegal income, focusing mainly on the development of the public policy
doctrine. Following that will be a discussion of the policy factors underlying
the codification of section 280E along with a critical evaluation of the
legislation. The ultimate argument will be that section 280E should be omitted
from the Code.
II. HISTORICAL ANALYSIS
A.

Prior Legislation and Historical Treatment of Illegal Income

The drafters of the 1913 Internal Revenue Code, which imposed an income
tax similar to that currently in use,10 specifically avoided stating that the Code
would tax only legal income. The Supreme Court has acknowledged that
“[d]uring the Senate debate in 1913 on the bill that became the first modern
income tax law, amendments were rejected that would have limited deductions
for losses to those incurred in a ‘legitimate’ or ‘lawful’ trade or business.”11

7. Since income tax is determined by applying a tax rate to taxable income, denying
deductions to gross income will result in a higher net income, which, therefore, will result in a
higher tax rate.
8. See infra text accompanying note 62.
9. The majority of the statistical analysis dealing with the effectiveness of § 280E was
conducted in the mid-to-late 1980s, shortly after the provision was enacted. See Jeffery A. Dubin
et al., The Changing Face of Tax Enforcement, 1978-1988, 43 TAX LAW. 893 (1990); GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GENERAL GOVERNMENT DIVISION, TAX ADMINISTRATION:
INVESTIGATING ILLEGAL INCOME—SUCCESS UNCERTAIN, IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED (1988).
10. JOHN F. WITTE, THE POLITICS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 7677 (1985) (setting forth the general provisions of the former income tax, which is similar to that
currently in use, for example, the 1913 tax utilized graduated rates and provided for an initial
exemption).
11. Comm’r v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687, 691 (1966) (citations omitted).
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During those debates, Senator Williams (the senator sponsoring the bill) stated
that “‘[t]he object of the bill is to tax a man’s net income . . . . not to reform
men’s moral characters[;]. . . . [t]he law does not care where he got [his
income] from, so far as the tax is concerned . . . .’”12 Thus, there was an
explicit legislative intent that the Code should ignore the underlying source of
income for tax purposes.
Subsequent judicial opinions reinforced the idea that the tax code is not
concerned with the underlying nature of the income-producing activity when it
comes to levying a tax on gross income. For example, in United States v.
Sullivan, the U.S. Supreme Court held that “the fact that a business is unlawful
should [not] exempt it from paying the taxes that if lawful it would have to
pay.”13 When dealing specifically with proceeds from illegal drug transactions,
courts have found that those proceeds are includable in gross income.14 In
Wood v. United States, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals recognized “that the
gains from illegal activities are just as taxable as gains from legal activities.”15
In recognizing that the income from illegal drug transactions is includable in
gross income, courts continue to adhere to the long-standing tradition that the
tax code is not concerned with the source of the income.16 The primary
purpose of the Code is still, as originally stated by Senator Williams in the
early 1900s, to levy a tax on net income.17 Also, the Internal Revenue Service
(I.R.S.) has continued to acknowledge that all income is taxable, regardless of
the legality or illegality of the income-producing activity.18
Courts have also recognized that it is important to examine the nature of
the tax imposed on illegal income. Although there is no distinction as to the
source of taxable receipts19 and a tax used to raise revenue is valid even if the

12. Id. at 691-692 (citation omitted).
13. United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259, 263 (1927) [hereinafter Sullivan I].
14. Wood v. United States, 863 F.2d 417, 418 (5th Cir. 1989); Gambina v. Comm’r, 91 T.C.
826, 829 (1988); Browning v. Comm’r, 61 T.C.M. (CCH) 2053 (1991).
15. Wood, 863 F.2d at 419 (applying the actual dominion and control test for determining
whether or not proceeds are gain for the purposes of inclusion in gross income).
16. Courts have acknowledged numerous times that income from illegal activities, not just
drug trafficking, is includable in gross income, regardless of the legality or illegality of the
income-producing activity. See, e.g., Browning 61 T.C.M. (CCH) 2053 (holding that § 61 gross
income includes gains from illegal activities); Toner v. Comm’r, 60 T.C.M. (CCH) 1016 (1990)
(holding that income from massage parlor and prostitution are includable in gross income and the
operators or the business are entitled to take business expense deductions); Tech. Adv. Mem. 9207-004 (Feb. 14, 1992) (advising that “gains acquired by a taxpayer from drug smuggling are
includible in the taxpayer’s gross income”).
17. Comm’r v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687, 691-92 (1966).
18. I.R.S. Pub. No. 525; Taxable and Nontaxable Income (2001) at 26, available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p525.pdf (last visited August 24, 2002).
19. Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 429 (1955).
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business is conducted in violation of a law,20 a tax may not impose a higher
burden on illegal income and must “be imposed alike on the just and unjust.”21
The Supreme Court has found that one way of imposing a higher tax burden on
specific businesses lay in denying business deductions based on the illegality
of the business, which, in effect, imposes a tax on the gross receipts while
other legitimate businesses are taxed on net income.22 Yet, section 280E
accomplishes just this effect; in denying deductions to drug traffickers, those
taxpayers are subjected to a tax on almost all of their net income.23
Although the courts, the legislature and the I.R.S. historically have been
willing to ignore the nature of the business when levying a tax on income, that
blind eye comes into sharp focus when confronting attempts to take business
deductions under section 162. Uneasiness in allowing deductions to taxpayers
conducting illegal businesses has led to the gradual establishment of the public
policy doctrine. The public policy doctrine is a judicially created doctrine,
which enables judges to disallow certain expenses arising from illegal
activities.24 One of the first cases to deal with the public policy exception to
section 162 involved the question of deductibility of attorney’s fees.25 The
court denied the taxpayer’s attempt to deduct his attorney’s fees resulting from
a charge of perjury, by relying on the idea that allowing such a deduction
might give the impression that courts condoned this type of activity.26
After Backer, judicial decisions dealing with the public policy exception to
section 162 tended to “focus on the statutory words ‘ordinary and necessary’ as
a means to restrict the deductions available to illegal enterprises.”27
Eventually, the Supreme Court established a two-prong public policy
exception to allowing section 162 business deductions. First, even if a
business expenditure is ordinary and necessary, it may not be deductible if it
sharply frustrates a “defined national or state public polic[y] proscribing
particular types of conduct, . . . [but] [t]he policies frustrated must be . . .
evidenced by some governmental declaration of them.”28 In addition, a
business expense deduction will be denied upon the grounds of the public
20. United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 293 (1935).
21. Id. (citations omitted).
22. Comm’r v. Sullivan, 356 U.S. 27, 29 (1958) [hereinafter Sullivan II]; Tellier, 383 U.S. at
692.
23. See supra note 7.
24. See generally Charles A. Borek, The Public Policy Doctrine and Tax Logic: The Need
for Consistency in Denying Deductions Arising from Illegal Activities, 22 U. BALT. L. REV. 45,
49-57 (1992) (discussing the development of the public policy doctrine).
25. Backer v. Comm’r, 1 B.T.A. 214, 217 (1924) (referencing the Revenue Act of 1918,
where the equivalent of § 162 was § 214(a)(1)); Borek, supra note 24, at 49 n.32.
26. Backer, 1 B.T.A. at 217; Borek, supra note 24, at note 32.
27. Borek, supra note 24, at 49-50.
28. Lilly v. Comm’r, 343 U.S. 90, 96-97 (1952) (referencing the Internal Revenue Code of
1939, where the equivalent of § 162 was § 23(a)(1)(A)).
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policy exception if “a taxpayer has violated a federal or a state statute and
incurred a fine or penalty . . . .”29 In Tank Truck Rentals, the test for
nondeductibility was dependent “upon the severity and immediacy of the
frustration that would follow from allowing the deduction.”30 In Commissioner
v. Sullivan, the Court found that business expenses were “nondeductible on the
basis of public policy if: (1) the deduction itself is a device to lessen the
economic effect of a penalty imposed by statute, or (2) the deduction would
contravene a federal policy expressed in a statute or regulation.”31
Even as the Supreme Court was developing the two-prong test for
deductibility, the Court’s decisions continued to focus on the nature of the
expenditure, not the conduct that gave rise to it. Courts have consistently
refused to deny business deductions simply because “an expenditure bears a
remote relation to an illegal act . . . .”32 In Sullivan II, a case decided the same
day as Tank Truck Rentals, the Court specifically allowed the owner and
operator of an illegal gambling enterprise to take deductions for rent and
wages.33 The Sullivan II Court recognized “‘that the fact that an expenditure
bears a remote relation to an illegal act’ does not make it nondeductible.”34
Therefore, because the rent and wage expenditures were ordinary and
necessary expenses in the commonly accepted definitions of the words, the
taxpayer was allowed to take a deduction, even though the expenses were
associated with an illegal enterprise.35 In addition, six years later in
Commissioner v. Tellier, the Supreme Court allowed a taxpayer to take section
162 business expense deductions despite the public policy exception.36 The
Court specifically adopted the Sullivan II reasoning, expressly refusing to
disallow the deduction solely because of the illegal nature of the underlying
business.37 Therefore, the Supreme Court has established a reluctance to deny
business expense deductions simply because the business itself happens to be
an illegal enterprise. In fact, courts start with the assumption that the expense
is valid and, therefore, deductible, regardless of the nature of the business.
Only in certain situations will the public policy doctrine operate to bar
deductibility of the expense.38
29. Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Comm’r, 356 U.S. 30, 34 (1958) (referencing the Internal
Revenue Code of 1939, where the equivalent of § 162 was § 23(a)(1)(A)).
30. Borek, supra note 24, at 53 (recognizing two categories of deductions that frustrate
public policy: illegal payments and payment of government imposed penalties).
31. Sullivan II, 356 U.S. 27, 28-29 (1958); Borek, supra note 24, at 53.
32. Comm’r v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467, 474 (1943). See also Comm’r v. Tellier, 383 U.S.
687, 690 (1966); Sullivan II, 356 U.S. at 29; Comm’r v. Toner, 60 T.C.M. (CCH) 1016 (1990).
33. Sullivan II, 356 U.S. at 29.
34. Id. at 29 (quoting Comm’r v. Heininger, 320 U.S. at 474).
35. Id.
36. Tellier, 383 U.S. at 690-91.
37. Id. at 692.
38. Borek, supra note 24, at 55.
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Eventually, Congress codified the public policy exception by amending
parts of section 162. In the Tax Reform Act of 1969, Congress codified the
public policy exception by disallowing deductions for payment of penalties
and payments that violate the law.39 Although this amendment would coexist
with the recognized, judicially-created public policy exception, Congress also
intended “its codified version of the public policy doctrine to completely
occupy this area of the tax law.”40 In other words, although the judicial test
was still valid, these new amendments to section 162 were intended to be the
full and complete statement of the public policy doctrine.
At this point, it is important to note that the Supreme Court recognized that
the deduction of section 162 ordinary and necessary business expenses could
be “disallowed by specific legislation, since deductions ‘are a matter of grace
and Congress can, of course, disallow them as it chooses.’”41 This Comment
does not suggest that Congress has neither the right nor the power to make
such decisions. Rather, this Comment is intended to demonstrate that section
280E should be omitted from the Code for other reasons. Specifically, section
280E should be omitted because: (1) it is against the original intent of the
drafters of the Code; (2) the section does not comply with the general
functioning of the Code; (3) other considerations overcome public policy
considerations, even though section 280E conforms to the public policy
exception; and (4) efforts to use the tax code to deter the drug trade are likely
to be ineffective.
Although it may appear incongruous to suggest that section 280E should
be omitted from the Code while not taking exception with sections 162(c),42
162(e)(1)(A)43 and 162(f),44 the differences between the sections becomes
apparent upon close examination. Harkening back to the judicial development
of the public policy doctrine, those opinions made specific mention of the
nature of the payments and refused to focus on the legality or illegality of the
business giving rise to the payment.45 If a payment (not a business) violated a
federal or state policy expressly set forth in a statute or tended to lessen the
economic effect of a statutory penalty, the payment was not deductible under

39. Id. at 55-56.
40. Id.
41. Tellier, 383 U.S. at 693 (quoting Sullivan II, 356 U.S. 27, 28 (1958)).
42. See I.R.C. § 162(c) (2000) (preventing a deduction for illegal payments, including bribes
and kickbacks).
43. See I.R.C. § 162(e)(1)(A) (2000) (preventing a deduction for payments intended to
influence legislation).
44. See I.R.C. § 162(f) (2000) (preventing a deduction for payment of fines or penalties
imposed because of a violation of a law).
45. See supra notes 24-40 and accompanying text.
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section 162.46 However, legal payments, such as rent, wages or legal fees,
even if made in connection with an illegal business, were deductible.47
By analogy, the 1969 amendments to section 162 focused on the nature of
the payments and not the nature of the business that would make the payments
necessary. For example, section 162(c) denies a deduction for illegal bribes,
kickbacks and other illegal payments.48 Section 162(e)(1) denies a deduction
for payments made in an attempt to influence legislation or for lobbying.49
Section 162(f) denies a deduction for fines or similar penalties incurred
because of a violation of the law.50 None of these sections refers to the nature
of the business giving rise to the payment. The language of each section
speaks specifically to the illegality of the payment itself, not to the legality or
illegality of the underlying business giving rise to the payment.
In contrast, section 280E denies deductions and credits for amounts “paid
or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business if such
trade or business . . . consists of trafficking in controlled substances. . . .”51
The specific language of the statute refers to the nature of the underlying
business giving rise to the payment sought to be deducted. This language is a
noticeable and blatant departure from the traditional accepted focus on the
nature of the payment itself. Section 280E denies a taxpayer who operates a
drug business the opportunity to deduct ordinary legal expenses such as rent
and wages, while taxpayers operating different types of illegal businesses, such
as prostitution52 or contract killing, will be permitted to take the same
deductions. This departure from the traditional focus on the nature of the
payment is incongruous and indicates that section 280E should be omitted
from the Code.
The suggestion that the Code’s treatment of drug traffickers is
diametrically opposed to the tax treatment of other illegal businesses is
supported by the case law. For example, in Toner v. Commissioner, the
taxpayer was allowed to take section 162 ordinary and necessary business
expense deductions for “office furnishings, telephones, a security system, . . .
advertising[,]. . . . rent, heat, some insurance, and some automobile expenses”
in connection with his massage parlor and prostitution business.53 In fact, not
only was the petitioner able to take those business expense deductions, the
Court held that the taxpayer was allowed to take greater deductions than the
46. Comm’r v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467, 473-74 (1943).
47. Sullivan II, 356 U.S. 27, 29 (1958); Heininger, 320 U.S. at 473-474; Comm’r v. Tellier,
383 U.S. 383, 694-695 (1966).
48. I.R.C. § 162(c).
49. I.R.C. § 162(e)(1).
50. I.R.C. § 162(f).
51. I.R.C. § 280E (emphasis added).
52. See generally Toner v. Comm’r, 60 T.C.M. (CCH) 1016 (1990).
53. Id.
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I.R.S. had previously allowed because “petitioners maintained records which
would have enabled [the] Court to find more deductions than those allowed by
respondent.”54 Obviously, prostitution is an illegal enterprise,55 and with the
high rates of AIDS and sexually transmitted diseases, one could make an
argument that there is a public policy in the United States against prostitution.
However, none of these considerations has resulted in a similar tax code
provision regulating prostitution.
Even though there are equally strong public policy reasons for prohibiting
other illegal activities such as prostitution, gambling56 or contract killing, those
activities have not been subject to the same unfavorable tax treatment as drug
trafficking. As demonstrated in the Toner case, courts are willing to recognize
that other types of illegal businesses are entitled to the same tax credits and
deductions that are available to taxpayers operating legal businesses.
III. THE ADDITION OF SECTION 280E TO THE CODE
A.

Enactment of Section 280E

Section 280E was added to the Code in 1982 as a part of the Tax Equity
and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982.57 The amendment was included in Title
III, Taxpayer Compliance, of the House Report that accompanied the bill.58
Title III was further subdivided into subparts and the amendments to section
280E were contained in Part II, Subtitle I, Other Provisions.59 The House
Report lists only the text of the amendment and its effective date, yet gives
little indication of Congress’ intent behind the enactment of this section.60
The Senate Report, however, is much more instructive as to congressional
intent. Similar to the House Report, the Senate Report is divided into
numerous sections. The amendment to section 280E is included under C,
Provisions Designed to Improve Taxpayer Compliance.61 There, the Senate

54. Id.
55. This argument does not ignore the fact that in some areas, such as Nevada, prostitution is
a legal activity. In those cases, owners of a prostitution business would be required to follow the
tax laws and would be entitled to all ordinary and necessary business expense deductions.
56. See Comm’r v. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23, 32 (1987) (recognizing that “[f]ederal and state
legislation and court decisions . . . have not been noticeably favorable to gambling endeavors and
even have been reluctant to treat gambling on a parity with more ‘legitimate’ means of making a
living.”). However, the Groetzinger decision and I.R.C. § 162(d) limit deductions for operating a
gambling business to the gains from gambling.
57. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 640
(1982) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 280E).
58. H.R. REP. NO. 97-760, at 76 (1982).
59. Id. at 7.
60. Id. at 598.
61. S. REP NO. 97-494, at 309 (1982) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 280E).
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expressly sets forth the following justification for adding this amendment to
the Code:
To allow drug dealers the benefit of business expense deductions at the same
time that the U.S. and its citizens are losing billions of dollars per year to such
persons is not compelled by the fact that such deductions are allowed to other,
legal, enterprises. Such deductions must be disallowed on public policy
grounds.62

This language demonstrates that Congress relied expressly on public policy
as its justification for adding section 280E to the Code. However, there is no
indication that Congress attempted to satisfy the public policy exception test
already set forth by the Supreme Court, and there is no specific mention of the
statistical information that Congress relied upon in reaching its conclusion. In
fact, the Senate gives little more than a passing acknowledgment that this new
amendment will be co-existing with the previous amendments to section 162
that were intended to fully occupy this area of the law.63
It is possible that the addition of section 280E had little to do with public
policy and everything to do with bureaucratic survival. There has been a
suggestion that the enactment of drug legislation has been little more than an
attempt by numerous bureaucrats “to ‘generate’ demand for a bureau’s own
services through direct lobbying, policy manipulation, and the selective release
of information to other interest groups and the media.”64 This is particularly
true as it relates to the Treasury Department and its role in the war on drugs,
because the nation’s program for dealing with the drug problem “is one
‘which, to all intents and purposes, was established by the decisions of
administrative officials of the Treasury Department.’”65 The Treasury
Department’s Federal Bureau of Narcotics was responsible for enforcing both
the Harrison Act, passed in 1914 (establishing federal taxes on narcotics), and
the Marijuana Tax Act, passed in 1937.66 However, after 1937, the Federal
Bureau of Narcotics began to face stiff competition for attention from both the
public and Congress, who began to view the Federal Bureau of Investigation as
the proper bureau for crime control; hence, the Federal Bureau of Narcotics
needed to create more “demand” for its services in order to survive as an
agency.67 Lobbying for the passage of tax legislation that would require
62. Id.
63. Id. See also Borek, supra note 24.
64. Bruce L. Benson & David W. Rasmussen, Predatory Public Finance and the Origins of
the War on Drugs: 1984-1989, in TAXING CHOICE: THE PREDATORY POLITICS OF FISCAL
DISCRIMINATION 204 (William F. Shughart II ed., 1997) (using federal and local law
enforcement agencies and the Treasury Department’s Federal Bureau of Narcotics as examples of
agencies likely to use this technique).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 204-205.
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enforcement by the Bureau of Narcotics would certainly be one way to ensure
survival of the agency.
However, even if one does not agree with this “bureaucratic survival”
argument as an explanation for enactment of section 280E, public policy still
does not provide a believable justification for amending the Code. As
previously mentioned, in the House Report accompanying the bill, the
amendment was included under a section entitled “Taxpayer Compliance.”68
Within this section, the Senate stated that there is a sharply defined public
policy against drug dealing.69 However, in the next paragraph, the Senate also
stated that, in order “[t]o preclude possible challenges on constitutional
grounds, the adjustment to gross receipts with respect to effective costs of
goods sold is not affected by this provision of the bill.”70 The I.R.S. has
honored the Senate’s finding: “I.R.C. § 280E does not, however, affect the
computation of cost of goods sold.”71 Therefore, even though there is a
“defined” public policy against drug dealing, and normal business expense
deductions are denied to drug traffickers, a drug trafficker may still take into
account cost of goods sold.72
Two issues arise from the foregoing information. First, how does a
provision denying section 162 ordinary and necessary business expense
deductions improve taxpayer compliance? Second, if the public policy against
drug trafficking is so great, how does allowing adjustments for costs of goods
sold not violate this public policy? Denying business expense deductions to a
particular group of business owners does little to improve taxpayer
compliance, and, in fact, probably operates to the opposite effect. In essence,
if a taxpayer is denied a deduction for all of the ordinary and necessary, nonillegal expenses associated with operating a business, that taxpayer has no
incentive for reporting his income to the I.R.S., other than avoiding the normal
risks and penalties associated with failing to file a federal income tax return.73
68. See supra text accompanying note 58.
69. S. REP. NO. 97-494, at 309 (1982).
70. Id.
71. I.R.M. 31.4.8.6, available at http://www.irs.gov/taxpros/display/0,,i1%3D5%26
genericId%3D22559,00.html (last visited August 24, 2002).
72. See e.g., Vasta v. Comm’r, 58 T.C.M. (CCH) 263 (1989) (recognizing that, even though
the taxpayer did not supply the court with sufficient evidence to allow a deduction for cost of
goods sold, such a deduction would be allowed upon a record of expenditures for cost of goods
sold).
73. Depending upon the taxpayer’s classification as either a delinquent filer or a taxpayer
who has not filed a return at all, the penalties that the I.R.S. may assess include the Failure to File
Penalty (I.R.C. § 6651(a)(1)(2000)), the Estimated Tax Penalty (I.R.C. §§ 6654-55 (2000)), the
Failure to Pay Penalty (I.R.C. § 6651(a)(2)(2000)), the Fraud or Negligence Additions (Pre-1989
I.R.C. § 6653), the Fraudulent Failure to File (Post-1988 I.R.C. § 6651(f)(2000)) and the
Accuracy Penalty (I.R.C. § 6662(a)(2000)). In fact, the IRS relies on voluntary compliance.
“Compliance is achieved when a taxpayer makes a good faith effort to meet the tax obligations
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Therefore, even though a provision denying ordinary and necessary business
expense deductions to a drug trafficker may be pertinent to the public policy
against drug dealing, the same provision could operate against the defined
public policy in favor of paying one’s income taxes.74 The public policy
justification also seems overshadowed by the allowance for the cost of goods
sold. Although a drug trafficker may be denied a deduction for rent, wages
and other necessary legal costs of operating a business, he will be allowed to
make adjustments for the cost of goods sold, in this case, drugs, the very item
that makes his operation illegal in the first place. This double standard relating
to drugs, ostensibly to avoid constitutional challenges, flies in the face of the
public policy justification provided as the reason for the amendment.
B.

Evaluation of the Components of Section 280E

The section can be divided into three major parts: (a) it bars credits or
deductions (b) for the cost of carrying on a business which consists of
trafficking in controlled substances (c) either within the meaning of Schedule I
and II of the Controlled Substances Act or which is prohibited by any state or
federal law.75 By focusing on one type of business, this section affects only a
proportionally small, particularized segment of the taxpaying public.
One effect of this statute is that it bars drug traffickers from taking section
162 ordinary and necessary business expense deductions.76 However, this
statute applies only to those who traffic in particular types of drugs, both those
contained in Schedules I and II of the Controlled Substances Act, and those
that are made illegal by federal or state laws.77 The Controlled Substances Act
defined by the Internal Revenue Code. Penalties support voluntary compliance by assuring
compliant taxpayers that tax offenders are identified and penalized.” I.R.M. 20.1.1.2.1, available
at http://www.irs.gov/taxpros/display/0,,i1%3D5%26genericId%3D22410,00.html (last visited
August 25, 2002).
74. For instance, a business owner operating a massage parlor that provided prostitution
services was allowed to take § 162 business expense deductions, and, therefore, reported his
income to the I.R.S. and kept the necessary documentation to support his deductions. See Toner
v. Comm’r, 60 T.C.M. (CCH) 1016 (1990); Vasta, 58 T.C.M. (CCH) 263.
75. I.R.C. § 280E (2000).
76. See id.
77. Id. Each Schedule of the Controlled Substances Act requires specific findings in order
for a drug to be classified. The findings required for Schedule I are: “(A) The drug or other
substance has a high potential for abuse. (B) The drug or other substance has no currently
accepted medical use in treatment in the United States. (C) There is a lack of accepted safety for
use of the drug or other substance under medical supervision.” ALEXANDER T. SHULGIN,
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES: A CHEMICAL AND LEGAL GUIDE TO FEDERAL DRUG LAWS 11 (2d
ed. 1992). The findings required for inclusion under Schedule II are: “(A) The drug or other
substance has a high potential for abuse. (B) The drug or other substance has a currently accepted
medical use in treatment in the United States or a currently accepted medical use with severe
restrictions. (C) Abuse of the drug or other substance may lead to severe psychological or
physical dependence.” Id. The requirements for scheduling under Schedules III-V all include
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was originally enacted in 1970, and was intended as an effort to reduce supply
of illegal drugs.78 The Act focuses on a “supply reduction/law enforcement
approach” by assigning substances to one of five schedules, and attacking
“drug abuse and trafficking at four levels: (1) possession; (2) production; (3)
distribution; and (4) laundering of proceeds.”79 The drugs included on
Schedules I and II of the Controlled Substances Act are listed by their chemical
names, which can make recognition of their street-name equivalents difficult
for the layperson.80 However, amphetamines, cocaine, codeine, heroin,
lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD), marijuana, methampehtamines, morphine
and opium are some examples of common street drugs found on either
Schedule I or II of the Controlled Substances Act.81
Therefore, section 280E bars credits or deductions to those whose primary
business is trafficking in controlled substances, including marijuana, heroin,
amphetamines and cocaine. Although these drugs may include the great
majority of inventory that is the illegal drug trade, the preceding paragraphs are
intended to show that section 280E does not apply to all drug traffickers.
IV. OMITTING SECTION 280E FROM THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE
A.

Section 280E Contradicts the Intent of the Original Drafters of the Code.

The originally stated purpose of the Code was to tax all income. During
the Congressional debates concerning enactment of the 1913 Internal Revenue
Code, Senator Williams (the senator in charge of the bill) stated that “‘[t]he
object of the bill is to tax a man’s net income . . . not to reform men’s moral
characters[;] . . . [t]he law does not care where he got [his income] from, so far
as the tax is concerned . . . .’”82 In addition, the current Code defines gross
income as “all income from whatever source derived . . . .”83 Therefore, the

requirements that the drug have a currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United
States; however, beyond that, the requirements for Schedules III-V focus on the drug’s potential
for abuse and degree of physical or psychological dependence. Id.
78. SENATE CAUCUS ON INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL AND THE HOUSE
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 105TH CONG., REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL
NARCOTICS CONTROL AND UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY: A COMPILATION OF LAWS,
TREATIES, EXECUTIVE DOCUMENTS, AND RELATED MATERIALS, at xxiii (J. Comm. Print 1997).
79. Id.
80. Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 812 (2000).
81. See generally SHULGIN, supra note 77, at 13-242 (providing an exhaustive list of the
original names, synonyms, Chemical Abstracts Service Numbers and Drug Code Numbers of all
drugs which are, or ever have been, included under Schedules I-V of the Controlled Substances
Act).
82. See Comm’r v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687, 691-92 (1966) (citation omitted).
83. I.R.C. § 61(a) (2000).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2003]

THE IMPLICATIONS OF I.R.C. § 280E

169

Code has never been intended to make a distinction between incomes earned
through legal or illegal businesses.
One way a tax system may discriminate between the underlying natures of
income-producing activities is through a provision just like section 280E.
Courts have been willing to recognize that it is important to examine the nature
of the tax imposed on illegal income.84 Although there is no distinction as to
the source of taxable receipts,85 and a tax used to raise revenue is valid even if
the business is conducted in violation of a law,86 a tax may not impose a higher
burden of taxation on illegal income and must “be imposed alike on the just
and unjust.”87 The Supreme Court has recognized that one possible way of
imposing a higher tax burden on a specific business lay in denying business
deductions based on the illegality of the business, which, in effect, imposes a
tax on the gross receipts while other legitimate businesses are taxed on net
income.88 Section 280E accomplishes just this effect; in denying deductions to
drug traffickers, those taxpayers are subjected to a tax on almost all of their net
income.89
By denying section 162 deductions to a drug trafficker, that taxpayer
cannot deduct ordinary and necessary business expenses, which results in a
higher net income. Therefore, the tax will be imposed on a greater amount of
the taxpayer’s net income if that taxpayer engages in drug trafficking, as
opposed to some other legal business, or even some other illegal, but more
acceptable, business. This provision impermissibly distinguishes between the
natures of taxpayers’ incomes. In so discriminating, the tax is not “imposed
alike on the just and unjust.”90
Allowing section 280E to remain in the Code is not only harmful because
it impermissibly distinguishes between the legality or illegality of underlying
income, it is also harmful to the structure of the Code itself. The Code is a
working instrument and no one provision can be taken in isolation from the
others. In order to properly and accurately report income tax, a taxpayer must
obey all applicable sections of the Code.91 However, a deadweight provision
such as section 280E does little to preserve the vitality of the Code, and,
instead, becomes another regulation that taxpayers must follow.
Unfortunately, as will be discussed below, section 280E is not effective and no

84. See Sullivan II, 356 U.S. 27, 29 (1958); United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 293
(1935) (holding that a tax may not impose a higher burden of taxation on illegal income).
85. Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 429 (1955).
86. Constantine, 296 U.S. at 293.
87. Id. (citations omitted).
88. Sullivan II, 356 U.S. at 29; Comm’r v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687, 692 (1966).
89. See supra note 7.
90. Constantine, 296 U.S. at 293.
91. For instance, in order to reach the correct taxable income, a taxpayer must compute the
correct amount of gross income under I.R.C. § 61 (2000).
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longer serves its purpose in light of other powers the I.R.S. has at its disposal
for dealing with drug traffickers.92
The harm from section 280E is not only demonstrated by its uselessness,
but also by the lack of similar provisions anywhere else in the Code. Although
there are particular sections, which apply only to certain taxpayers if they
chose to engage in a particular type of activity,93 none of those provisions so
radically focuses on the nature of the income producing activities of one
particular group of taxpayers to the exclusion of all others. Using section
162(b) as an example, the previous statement is meant to illustrate the fact that,
although a provision may deny a charitable gift as a business deduction, that
provision denies such deductions to any taxpayer making a charitable gift.
However, section 280E, on the other hand, focuses specifically on drug dealers
to the exclusion of all other business owners and operators. Focusing on a
particular group, to the exclusion of all others, is contrary to the general
workings of the Code and its supposed uniform applicability to all taxpayers.
Even the public policy against drug dealing is not strong enough to override
the purpose and function of the Code: “[e]ven if policy outcomes seem to
conform to majority will and democratic procedures are followed
satisfactorily, they may produce a generally pernicious and possibly selfdefeating result.”94 The continued inclusion of section 280E in the Code is
harmful and against the original intent of the drafters of the Code.
The tax treatment of other illegal businesses illustrates that section 280E is
an anomalous provision. As was discussed above in the prostitution example,
using the Toner case as a specific example, operators of other types of illegal
businesses are allowed to take ordinary and necessary business expense
deductions when determining their net income.95 There is no mention in that
case of a potential public policy that would justify treating the income from
prostitution similarly to the income of drug traffickers. However, an argument
can be made that the social problems associated with prostitution are serious
enough to warrant drastic tax treatment in order to discourage people from
engaging in that type of business. The absence of any such provision in the
Code regulating the income from prostitution businesses is a further indication
that section 280E is completely at odds with the general functioning of the
Code as it pertains to tax treatment of income from illegal businesses.96

92. See infra text accompanying notes 114-28.
93. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 162(b) (denying business expense deductions for charitable gifts or
contributions).
94. WITTE, supra note 10, at 268.
95. See supra text accompanying notes 52-54.
96. A somewhat similar provision is section 165(d), which allows the deductibility of losses
incurred in a gambling trade or business only to the extent of gains from such transactions. See
I.R.C. § 165(d). However, Congressional intent behind enacting this provision was “to force
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Although Section 280E Conforms to the Original Public Policy Exception,
Other Considerations Overshadow its Application in this Instance.

The public policy exception, as originally established by the U.S. Supreme
Court, prohibits section 162 ordinary and necessary business deductions if:
“(1) the deduction itself is a device to lessen the economic effect of a penalty
imposed by statute, or (2) the deduction would contravene a federal policy
expressed in a statute or regulation.”97 Normal payments in order to sustain
the operation of a drug trafficking business clearly do not fall within the scope
of the first prong of this test. Rent payments, wages, and other “normal”
business deductions are not the type of payment contemplated by the first
public policy exception.98 Therefore, attempting to declare a section 162
business deduction for the cost of carrying on an illegal drug business does not
seek to lessen the economic effect of a penalty imposed by statute.99
Allowing a section 162 business deduction to an illegal drug trafficker
would obviously contravene specific federal and state policies against the drug
trade. Other considerations, however, overshadow this contravention. The
specific federal policy against drug trafficking is found in the Controlled
Substances Act.100 Also, numerous state policies exist that make drug
trafficking an illegal activity. The Office of National Drug Control Policy
reports that “[e]very State has laws on its books that enable law enforcement
officials to prosecute those who sell drugs.”101 Therefore, every state and the
federal government have enacted legislation of some sort making it a
punishable crime to traffic drugs.
Although there are defined state and federal policies against drug dealing,
other considerations indicate that section 280E is not proper. Therefore,
ordinary and necessary business deductions should not be denied to drug
traffickers on any grounds, neither through section 280E nor through the public
policy exception to section 162. These considerations include: (a) the purpose
of the Code is not to enforce social policy; (b) section 280E does not further
the general purpose of the Code; and (c) this legislation is out-dated and is no
longer effective in the “war on drugs.”

taxpayers to report their gambling gains if they desire to deduct their gambling losses.” Praytor v.
Comm’r, 80 T.C.M. (CCH) 332 n.2 (2000).
97. Borek, supra note 24, at 54; Sullivan II, 356 U.S. 27, 28-29 (1958).
98. An example of deductions that would seek to lessen the economic effect of a penalty
imposed by a statute includes a deduction for a speeding ticket violation or an attempt to deduct a
fine paid for running overweight freight trucks. See, e.g., Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Comm’r,
356 U.S. 30, 34 (1958).
99. This argument assumes that a drug trafficker is not attempting to take an ordinary and
necessary business expense deduction for a fine incurred in an arrest for possession of drugs.
100. See supra text accompanying notes 78-79.
101. OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY, WHITE PAPER: STATE DRUG CONTROL
STATUS REPORT 7 (1990).
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The arguments that the purpose of the Code is not to enforce social policy
and that section 280E does not further the general purpose of the Code are
inter-related. As previously discussed, the history of the enactment of the
Code, in a form that is currently recognizable,102 suggests that the enactors
envisioned the Code as a way to collect revenue, and it was not intended to be
a tool used to regulate the manner in which people earned their income nor was
it intended to be a way to prohibit certain types of activities.103 Therefore, if
one accepts the contention that the Code should, in some respects, conform to
the original intent of the enactors, a provision that seeks to further a social
policy against drug dealing that has little or nothing to do with the collection of
revenue would not have a proper place in the Code.
In addition, section 280E is an outdated provision that is no longer (if it
ever was)104 effective in the war against drugs. Since the 1960s and 1970s,
Unites States’ drug policy has been “designed to suppress the production of
illicit drugs throughout the hemisphere,” thus, affecting the supply of drugs.105
However, during the first Bush administration, while the focus was still on
diminishing the supply of drugs, the national drug policy began to shift its
focus towards eliminating the demand for drugs.106 The importance of
focusing on decreasing the demand for illegal drugs has gained momentum and
importance in United States’ drug policy. For instance, in the Transmittal
Letter from the President concerning the 1997 National Drug Control Strategy,
President Clinton wrote:
Our strategy contains programs that will help youth to recognize the terrible
risks associated with the use of illegal substances. . . . All Americans must
accept responsibility to teach young people that drugs are wrong, drugs are
illegal, and drugs are deadly. We must renew our commitment to the drug

102. WITTE, supra note 10, at 76-77.
103. See supra text accompanying note 12.
104. From the very beginning of the “war on drugs,” the role of the I.R.S. has been illdefined. Section 280E was enacted into the Code at a time when the government was first
establishing a comprehensive plan to confront the nation’s drug problem. However, as has been
suggested in this Comment, the enactment of § 280E may have had little to do with drug
enforcement and more to do with bureaucratic survival. See supra text accompanying notes 6467. Even if one does not find the bureaucratic survival argument persuasive, as research shows,
the I.R.S. no longer uses § 280E as a proactive tool to catch unreported income from drug
traffickers or to prevent drug dealers from taking ordinary and necessary business expense
deductions. See infra text accompanying notes 119-122. Instead, the I.R.S. uses § 280E as a tool
to collect revenue from convicted drug dealers in calculating their unreported income, postconviction. See infra text accompanying notes 119-122.
105. Peter H. Smith, The Political Economy of Drugs: Conceptual Issues and Policy Options,
in DRUG POLICY IN THE AMERICAS 6 (Peter H. Smith ed., 1992).
106. Id. at 7.
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prevention strategies that deter first-time drug use and halt the progression
from alcohol and tobacco use to illicit drugs.107

Such statements, by former President Clinton in 1997, indicate that the federal
government is finding it increasingly important to focus on deterring
demand.108
Given the increasing importance of decreasing demand in the national drug
policy, section 280E, a provision of the Internal Revenue Code, enacted in
1982, when governmental policy focused almost exclusively on eradicating the
supply of drugs, no longer has an effective role in the American drug initiative.
In fact, the President’s 1997 Transmittal Letter sets forth five goals—none of
which pertain to the Treasury or to the I.R.S.—including: (1) educating and
enabling America’s youth to reject illegal drugs, as well as alcohol and
tobacco; (2) increasing the safety of America’s citizens by substantially
reducing drug-related crime and violence; (3) reducing health and social costs
to the public of illegal drug use; (4) shielding America’s air, land and sea
frontiers from the drug threat; and (5) breaking foreign and domestic drug
sources of supply.109 These goals illustrate the increased emphasis on reducing
demand, although there is still a substantial concern with decreasing supply.
However, these goals seem to suggest a small, if non-existent, role for the
I.R.S. in these anti-drug efforts. Certainly, the effect of section 280E, denying
ordinary and necessary business deductions, seems out-dated in the current
statement of the American drug policy.
Even the National Funding Priorities for Fiscal Years 1998-2002 indicate
that the I.R.S. has an increasingly smaller role in the national drug policy.110
The following list is comprised of areas that the Office of National Drug
Control Policy has identified for priority funding and will continue to give
priority funding to these areas during the five-year budget: (1) reducing youth
drug use; (2) reducing the consequences of chronic drug use; (3) reducing
drug-related crime and violence; (4) stopping the flow of drugs at United
States’ borders; and (5) reducing domestic and foreign sources of supply.111
These five goals illustrate the two major precepts underlying American drug
control policy: decreasing supply and reducing demand. Section 280E does

107. SENATE CAUCUS ON INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL AND THE HOUSE
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, supra note 78, at 395-96 (emphasis added).
108. Although the United States’ drug policy is increasingly focused on deterring demand for
drugs, attempts at decreasing supply have not been entirely eliminated. In fact, the U.S.
government has been involved in a program in which pilots contracted to work for the U.S.
government to fly over the Colombian rain forest and spray the chemical weed killer Roundup on
exposed coca fields. See 60 Minutes (CBS television broadcast, Jan. 13, 2002).
109. SENATE CAUCUS ON INTERNATIONAL CONTROL AND THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, supra note 78, at 401-07.
110. Id. at 421-22.
111. Id.
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not help to achieve either of these goals. Disallowing a section 162 business
deduction has no affect on diminishing supply and certainly does not reach
across to the ultimate end-user to affect his or her demand for the drug.
In fact, section 280E may work against these goals by creating a higher
demand for small-time dealers with no employees. Because the small-time
dealer may still take an adjustment for cost of goods sold, he can make
adjustments to his net income for the money he uses to purchase his “product.”
By allowing such an adjustment, dealers will not receive unfavorable tax
treatment for purchasing any amount of product. This could be especially
beneficial to smaller dealers who may not have the resources (or tax
accountants) that larger dealers are able to afford. Thus, a dealer could make
adjustments for all of the inventory he purchases, just as any other
businessperson who buys inventory as a part of running his business. Such an
anomaly in section 280E seems odd. The dealer may not take business
deductions for ordinary, legal payments such as rent and wages, but he can
make an adjustment to his net income for his inventory, in this case, drugs, the
one illegal aspect of his business!
Also, a revenue argument supports the contention that section 280E should
be omitted. Illegal drug production and trafficking is a huge business,
“generating global revenues in excess of $400 billion annually.”112 Now,
manufacturing and distributing drugs “requires lots of working capital, steady
supplies of raw materials, sophisticated manufacturing facilities, reliable
shipping contractors and wholesale distributors, the all-important marketing
arms and access to retail franchises for maximum market penetration.”113 In
other words, although the small-time dealer still has an important place in the
drug business, larger, vertically integrated groups that control every aspect
from growing the raw materials to the final street distribution, are gradually
being developed. By denying the small-time dealer, and the larger, more
corporate-structured syndicates, access to the normal business deductions, it
becomes less likely that any of these individuals will even report their income.
Therefore, the government is not taxing a portion of the available revenue.
In summary, section 280E no longer has a proper place in the Code.
Although it does conform to the public policy exception as originally
developed by the Supreme Court in that there is an expressly defined federal
and state policy against drug dealing, other considerations over-shadow the
application of the public policy exception in this instance. Generally, the Code
is not intended to enforce social policy, and, therefore, section 280E runs afoul
of the intent of the original drafters of the Code. Those drafters intended the
Code as a tool to raise revenue without references to the underlying source of
112. Matthew Brzezinski, Re-engineering the Drug Business, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2002, § 6
(Sunday Magazine), at 26.
113. Id.
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the income. Section 280E comes into direct confrontation with this
proposition by focusing on the nature of the drug trafficking business and
denying deductions only to drug traffickers. In addition, section 280E is an
outdated provision that no longer serves a purpose in the “war on drugs.” It
was enacted in 1982, at a time when the national drug control policy focused
on diminishing the supply of drugs in the United States. As time has passed
and the national strategy has matured, the goal of diminishing supply has come
to share at least equal footing with the goal of decreasing demand within the
United States. Section 280E does not play a role in diminishing supply nor in
decreasing demand. Therefore, this provision should be omitted from the
Code.
C. Section 280E Should Be Omitted from the Code Because the I.R.S. Can
Use Other tools in the “War on Drugs.”
The I.R.S. has played a subtler role in the “war on drugs” than those played
by law enforcement agencies and the criminal justice system.114 In order to
carry out its assigned functions, the I.R.S. has been delegated numerous
procedural tools to enable them to collect unreported income tax from drug
traffickers.
These procedures include: (1) jeopardy assessments and
termination assessments;115 (2) civil penalties for “failure to file a return,
understatement of income, and fraudulent concealment of illicit income;”116
and (3) criminal penalties for tax evasion, failure to file a return and fraud.117
These procedural tools co-exist with specific narcotics programs within the
U.S. Treasury Department that focus specifically on criminal investigations.
Examples of these programs include the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement
Task Force and the High Intensity Drug Area investigations.118 These specific
programs clearly establish the function of the I.R.S. in regards to the “war on
drugs,” and section 280E has an almost non-existent purpose in this function.
According to the I.R.S., the usefulness of section 280E is primarily found
in criminal tax computations.119 This section is “applied to criminal tax
computations to deny deductions and credits.”120 Therefore, section 280E is
applied to a drug traffickers’ taxes after he or she has been charged with

114. Elizabeth M. Rutherford, Note, Taxation of Drug Traffickers’ Income: What the Drug
Trafficker Profiteth, the IRS Taketh Away, 33 ARIZ. L. REV. 701, 702 (1991).
115. Id. at 705-06.
116. Id. at 707-08 (citations omitted).
117. Id. at 712 (citations omitted).
118. I.R.M. 9.5.7, available at http://www.irs.gov/taxpros/display/0,,i1=5&genericId=
22676,00.html (last visited August 24, 2002).
119. I.R.M. 31.4.8.3, available at http://www.irs.gov/taxpros/display/0,,i1%3D5%26generic
Id%3D22559,00.html (last visited August 24, 2002).
120. Id.
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earning illegal income through drug trafficking. The use of section 280E is
limited to:
(a) [c]ases in which the proposed defendant is simultaneously being charged
with narcotics offenses involving controlled substances listed in [the
Controlled Substances Act]; (b) [c]ases in which the proposed defendant has
been convicted under [the Controlled Substances Act] for trafficking in such
controlled substances during the taxable years involved in the criminal tax
prosecution; or, (c) [c]ases in which there is independent admissible evidence
sufficient to establish that the source of the proposed defendant’s income is
illegal trafficking in the controlled substances listed in [the Controlled
Substances Act].121

This function suggests that the true policy behind section 280E is not a public
policy consideration against drug trafficking, but rather a policy to tax a larger
amount of a drug trafficker’s income. Moreover, a drug trafficker will not use
this section when computing his taxes, but rather the government will use this
section to impose taxes on a greater amount of a drug dealer’s income.
However, nowhere in the legislative history is it stated that section 280E
should work to impose penalties on drug dealers. Instead, the legislature chose
to include the provision in a section entitled “Taxpayer Compliance.”122 In
actual practice, this section does not increase taxpayer compliance, but,
instead, imposes the revenue tax on a higher proportion of a drug dealer’s
income than on an income derived from legal activities. Thus, section 280E is
not a tool the I.R.S. uses to combat drugs, but is a statute that the I.R.S. uses
after-the-fact to raise revenue from the unreported income of a drug trafficker.
The other tools, with which the I.R.S. has the power to regulate and/or
investigate narcotics trafficking, are better suited for investigative and
regulatory purposes than section 280E. One of the major problems with taxing
a drug dealer’s income is the cash nature of the business. Because the illegal
nature of the business encourages dealers to conceal their identity, most rely on
cash transactions and keep little or no financial records.123 Therefore, the
I.R.S. is given the power to calculate a drug dealer’s taxable income through
the use of income reconstruction in both civil and criminal tax cases, as well as
in asset forfeiture proceedings.124 Income restructuring allows the I.R.S. to
reconstruct a taxpayer’s income in order to correctly tax previously unreported
income.125 In addition, the civil and criminal penalties that the I.R.S. is

121. Id.
122. See supra note 61.
123. Rutherford, supra note 114, at 704. See Charga v. Commissioner, 62 T.C.M. (CCH) 347
(1991), as an example of a drug trafficker’s reliance on cash transactions in all aspects of his
business and personal life in order to avoid detection.
124. Rutherford, supra note 114, at 712-13.
125. Id. at 704.
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entitled to impose on a taxpayer also reflect the I.R.S.’s power to enforce
compliance with the tax laws.
Congress did not intend section 280E as a provision to aid in raising
revenue,126 and section 280E does little to aid compliance with tax laws.
Instead, the provision comes into play only after a taxpayer has been accused
or convicted of drug trafficking.127 By using section 280E in such a manner,
the I.R.S. and the legislature are ignoring that “the I.R.S.’s main responsibility
is to collect revenue.”128 If the main responsibility of the I.R.S. is to collect
revenue, section 280E certainly does not help to achieve that goal. The other
procedural tools given to the I.R.S., including income reconstruction and asset
forfeiture, are better suited to collecting revenue from illegal drug traffickers.
Moreover, section 280E has no purpose in collecting revenue, other than
imposing taxation on a greater amount of a drug trafficker’s income; thus,
penalizing a drug trafficker who has in all likelihood already faced criminal
charges, as well as being assessed other civil and/or criminal penalties by the
I.R.S. Since section 280E has no real purpose in either increasing compliance
or raising revenue, but rather imposes a higher burden of taxation, it should be
omitted from the Code.
D. Any Efforts to Use the Code to Deter the Drug Trade Are Likely to be
Ineffective.
The preceding arguments have touched upon the fact that the true purpose
of the Code is to raise revenue. This is accomplished through the I.R.S., which
collects taxes and enforces compliance with the tax system. Efforts to deter
the drug trade through the Code are likely to be unsuccessful and will only
encourage drug dealers not to report their illegal income. The drug trade, to a
great extent, is a cash business; therefore, drug dealers keep scant records of
their transactions.129 In addition, dealers attempt to remain anonymous in
order to avoid detection and prosecution by the criminal justice system.130
Obviously, drug dealers and traffickers are reluctant to report their income for
fear of being detected. However, provisions such as section 280E, which
prevent a drug trafficker from using the normal form of business deductions
and credits can only further discourage a drug dealer from correctly reporting
his income. If section 280E was omitted from the Code, it could potentially
encourage voluntary compliance for some drug dealers who are smart enough

126. See supra text accompanying notes 61-63.
127. I.R.M. 31.4.8, available at http://www.irs.gov/taxpros/display/0,,i1%3D5%26genericId
%3D22559,00.html (last visited August 24, 2002).
128. Rutherford, supra note 114, at 712.
129. See Rutherford, supra note 114, at 704; see also Charga v. Comm’r, 62 T.C.M. (CCH)
347 (1991).
130. See Rutherford, supra note 114, at 704.
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to look into the future. Even if drug dealers are unable to avoid prosecution for
their illegal activities, some may be willing to report their income currently in
order to avoid being stuck with an incredibly large tax bill131 after they are
criminally charged with drug trafficking. Allowing section 280E to remain in
the Code will continue to act counter to the purpose of raising revenue. In
essence, by deterring drug traffickers from reporting their income, section
280E works against the Congressional intent that the I.R.C. be used to raise
revenue and impose a tax “alike on the just and unjust.”132
V. CONCLUSION
The facial effect of section 280E is to deny section 162 ordinary and
necessary business deductions to illegal drug traffickers. The stated legislative
purpose behind the enactment of this section was a public and social policy
justification. However, this section is not only inappropriate, but is out-dated
and ineffective as well. Although it conforms to the traditional public policy
exception to section 162, other considerations suggest that it should be omitted
from the Code. The section does not conform to the Code’s spirit and purpose
of raising revenue. In addition, it was enacted in the early 1980s, at a time
when our nation’s drug strategy focused on decreasing supply. Therefore, in
some ways it was probably intended to make drug dealing unprofitable, and,
thereby cause drug dealers to withdraw from the trade. No indication exists,
however, that section 280E has ever had the desired effect. Instead, this
section only encourages drug dealers to continue to not report their income in
an effort to avoid detection and taxation on a greater portion of their income.
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131. Charga, 62 T.C.M. (CCH) 347.
132. United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 293 (1935) (citations omitted).
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